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THE NECESSITY OF AN EQUITY AND COMITY ANALYSIS 
IN YOUNGER ABSTENTION DOCTRINE  
DREW ALAN HILLIER 
Today, courts and commentators treat the Younger doctrine as a 
central rule with several enumerated exceptions.  This prevailing view is 
incorrect.  An analysis of the exceptions to the Younger abstention 
doctrine demonstrates that the exceptions are merely applications of the 
equity and comity principles that the Younger Court used to justify 
abstention.  If federal courts blindly apply the exceptions to Younger v. 
Harris, as if the exceptions have independent legal justifications, they risk 
incorrectly determining the very cases that Younger doctrine requires 
them to avoid.  Instead, federal courts should always consider whether 
abstention is mandated under the principles of equity and comity.   
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THE NECESSITY OF AN EQUITY AND COMITY ANALYSIS 
IN YOUNGER ABSTENTION DOCTRINE 
DREW ALAN HILLIER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Reasoning from principles of equity and comity, the United States 
Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris1 held that federal courts should not 
enjoin pending state proceedings that implicate an important state interest.2  
Four exceptions to the Younger abstention doctrine apply when: (1) the 
state claim is brought in bad faith to harass the state defendant;3 (2) the 
federal court is asked to enjoin a patently unconstitutional law;4 (3) the 
defendant in the state proceeding is barred on procedural or other grounds 
from raising its federal claim;5 or (4) the State or both parties waive 
Younger abstention.6  Lower courts treat these exceptions as independent 
bases for departing from the Younger rule, as if justified by principles 
separate and apart from the Younger principles of equity and comity.  I 
argue that this prevailing view of the Younger exceptions is incorrect.   
An analysis of exceptions to the Younger abstention doctrine 
demonstrates that the exceptions are merely applications of the equity and 
comity principles that the Younger Court used to justify abstention.  In 
deciding whether to abstain from issuing injunctions that relate to pending 
state court litigation, federal courts should not blindly apply the exceptions 
to Younger v. Harris, as if the exceptions have independent legal 
justifications in and of themselves.  Instead, federal courts should always 
consider whether abstention is mandated under the principles of equity and 
comity.  Incidentally, this view reflects the approach taken by Justices 
Ginsburg, Scalia, Sotomayor, and Kagan in a different context.7   
                                                                                                                          
* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2015; Saint Louis University, B.A. 
summa cum laude 2010.  To my wife, Sarah.  I thank the editors of the Connecticut Law Review. 
1 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
2 Id. at 47–49. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 53–54. 
5 Id. at 43–44. 
6 Ohio Bureau of Emp’t Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 479–80 (1977). 
7 See Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191, 2216 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“It would be 
extraordinary for Congress to pass a law disturbing [the traditional state function of regulating the legal 
profession because] . . . . ‘[t]he National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and 
protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly 
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Part II provides an exposition of Younger abstention generally.  Part III 
argues that the exceptions to Younger abstention are merely the application 
of the principles of equity and comity.  Part IV uses contemporary cases to 
demonstrate why an understanding of the principles of equity and comity is 
essential to analyze properly a Younger abstention issue.  Finally, Part V 
addresses the strongest arguments against adopting my view of Younger 
abstention. 
II.  YOUNGER ABSTENTION 
Younger abstention is an example of federal courts creating 
impediments to deciding cases beyond the jurisdictional requirements of 
the Constitution.8  It is one of several non-constitutional abstention 
doctrines, many of which share the same policy justifications.9  Judge-
made bars to a federal court’s exercise of jurisdiction are based primarily 
on the desire to promote good relations between the federal and state 
systems.10  When a federal court invalidates a state law, the state’s citizens 
and government officials might bristle at the federal court’s interference.  
To the state legislator, the federal court represents a quasi-foreign power 
that need not have earned the approval of the state legislature, executive, or 
judiciary.11  The abstention doctrines also help federal courts to avoid 
erroneous interpretations of state law and unnecessary constitutional 
rulings.12 
                                                                                                                          
interfere with the legitimate activities of the States . . . .’” (quoting Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 
560 U.S. 413, 431 (2010))). 
8 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (delineating the constitutional limits of judicial power). 
9 See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941) (declaring that federal 
courts must abstain when an uncertainty in state law and a subsequent clarification of the uncertainty 
make a constitutional ruling by a federal court superfluous).  An additional abstention doctrine is the 
Burford doctrine, which: 
[A]llows a federal court to dismiss a case only if it presents “difficult questions of 
state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance 
transcends the result in the case then at bar,” or if its adjudication in a federal forum 
“would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a 
matter of substantial public concern.”   
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins., 517 U.S. 706, 726–27 (1996) (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. 
Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989)). 
10 See Pullman Co., 312 U.S. at 500 (“Few public interests have a higher claim upon the 
discretion of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies . . . .”). 
11 See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2 (vesting the president with the power to “nominate, and by and with 
the Advice and Consent of the Senate . . . Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the 
United States”). 
12 Pullman Co., 312 U.S. at 499–501.  Although the desire to avoid unnecessary constitutional 
rulings was not a justification clearly adopted by the Younger Court, the Supreme Court later noted that 
the desire is a justification for Younger abstention.  See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11–12 
(1987) (“Another important reason for [Younger] abstention is to avoid unwarranted determination [sic] 
of federal constitutional questions.  When federal courts interpret state statutes in a way that raises 
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The Younger abstention doctrine takes its name from a 1971 case, 
Younger v. Harris, where John Harris Jr. was charged with violating the 
California Criminal Syndicalism Act.13  Harris filed a complaint in federal 
court seeking an injunction to prevent the Los Angeles District Attorney 
from prosecuting him under the Act and alleging that the Act violated his 
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of free speech.14  The district court 
held that the Act was “void for vagueness and overbreadth in violation of 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments” and enjoined the District Attorney 
from prosecuting Harris for alleged violations of the Act.15  But Harris’s 
success was short lived.  In an opinion written by Justice Black, the 
Supreme Court held that the district court should have abstained from 
hearing the controversy.16   
The Court noted that one of the “primary sources” of the “longstanding 
public policy against federal court interference with state court 
proceedings” includes “the basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that 
courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a 
criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at 
law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.”17  The 
Court did not justify its holding solely on the traditional division between 
law and equity, but “by an even more vital consideration, the notion of 
‘comity,’ that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the 
fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state 
governments.”18 
Comity, also called “Our Federalism,” is a belief that states and their 
institutions should not be restrained in their ability to exercise “their 
separate functions in their separate ways.”19  The Court stated: 
[T]he normal thing to do when federal courts are asked to 
                                                                                                                          
federal constitutional questions . . . ‘the federal-court decision [is] advisory and the litigation 
underlying it meaningless.’ . . . Younger abstention in situations like this ‘offers the opportunity for 
narrowing constructions that might obviate the constitutional problem and intelligently mediate federal 
constitutional concerns and state interests.’” (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Moore v. 
Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 428–30 (1979))). 
13 401 U.S. 37, 38 (1971). 
14 Id. at 39. 
15 Id. at 40.  
16 Id. at 38, 54. 
17 Id. at 43–44. 
18 Id. at 44. 
19 Id.  Conceptually, Our Federalism is a species of the genus comity.  Compare Hilton v. Guyot, 
159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895) (noting that comity “is the recognition which one nation allows within its 
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to 
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are 
under the protection of its laws”), with BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1211 (9th ed. 2009) (defining 
“[O]ur [F]ederalism” as “[t]he doctrine holding that a federal court must refrain from hearing a 
constitutional challenge to state action if federal adjudication would be considered an improper 
intrusion into the state’s right to enforce its own laws in its own courts”). 
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enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is not to issue such 
injunctions[] . . . except under extraordinary circumstances, 
where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and 
immediate [or] . . . . “it plainly appears that [challenging the 
validity of a state statute in a state tribunal] would not afford 
adequate protection.”20 
While the Court noted the presence of federal statutes that prohibit 
injunctions against state proceedings, it emphasized that its decision not to 
allow an injunction rested “on the absence of the factors necessary under 
equitable principles to justify federal intervention.”21 
Justice Brennan, along with Justices White and Marshall, concurred in 
the result, noting that there was an ongoing state proceeding, that Harris 
had not alleged bad faith or harassment, and that his federal claims could 
be “adequately adjudicated” in the state proceeding.22  Justices Stewart and 
Harlan concurred to emphasize the Court’s holding that a federal court 
may not issue an injunction in an existing criminal proceeding, “save in 
exceptional and extremely limited circumstances, . . . [i.e.,] a threat of 
irreparable injury ‘both great and immediate,’” such as when a statute is 
“patently and flagrantly unconstitutional on its face . . . or if there has been 
bad faith and harassment—official lawlessness—in a statute’s 
enforcement.”23   
Only Justice Douglas dissented.24  Justice Douglas would have held 
that the California Criminal Syndicalism Act was illegal and allowed 
federal courts to interfere with criminal state proceedings whenever a 
“statute being enforced is unconstitutional on its face.”25  His dissent is 
noteworthy because Justice Douglas makes an argument that subsequent 
courts have sometimes overlooked.  He argues that notions of comity and 
Our Federalism are not static: 
Whatever the balance of the pressures of localism and 
nationalism prior to the Civil War, they were fundamentally 
altered by the war.  The Civil War Amendments made civil 
rights a national concern.  Those Amendments, especially § 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, cemented the change in 
American federalism brought on by the war.  Congress 
immediately commenced to use its new powers to pass 
legislation.  Just as the first Judiciary Act . . . and the “anti-
                                                                                                                          
20 Younger, 401 U.S. at 45 (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243–44 (1926)). 
21 Id. at 54 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
22 Id. at 56–57 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
23 Id. at 56 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
24 Id. at 38.  
25 Id. at 59 (Douglas, J. dissenting). 
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injunction” statute represented the early views of American 
federalism, the Reconstruction statutes, including the 
enlargement of federal jurisdiction, represent a later view of 
American federalism.26 
As Justice Douglas intimates, the use of comity and Our Federalism as 
talismans to justify a federal court’s degree of interference with a state 
proceeding are of limited substantive—if not also rhetorical—value given 
that the meaning of the terms is not linked necessarily to immutable and 
essential elements of our nation’s fabric—as is sometimes implied—but is 
instead always a contemporary normative claim.27  Recognizing that their 
use is an implicit claim about how the state and federal governments 
should interact allows for a better understanding and application of the 
doctrine. 
Accordingly, Younger is a barrier to federal courts issuing injunctions 
against pending state criminal proceedings when there is an adequate 
avenue of review of any federal claims and no unusual circumstance, such 
as bad faith prosecution or irreparable harm, that would require the federal 
court to exercise its equity powers.28  
As it stands today, Younger applies to virtually all state judicial and 
administrative proceedings that implicate an important state interest.29  
Although Younger abstention applies to civil proceedings if there is an 
important state interest,30 state civil litigation alone is not an important 
state interest sufficient to overcome Younger abstention.31  Thus, the 
Supreme Court has held that a federal court should abstain from 
adjudicating a dispute that is already before a state anti-discrimination 
administrative body.32   
Younger abstention turns on the principle of comity because without a 
state court proceeding, there is less risk of harming “federal-state 
                                                                                                                          
26 Id. at 61 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
27 But see Mary Brigid McManamon, Felix Frankfurter: The Architect of “Our Federalism,” 27 
GA. L. REV. 697, 705 (1993) (“[T]he Supreme Court has increasingly used [Our Federalism] . . . as a 
basis for deferring to the States at the expense of federal jurisdiction.”). 
28 See Ankenbrandt ex rel. L.R. v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992) (“Absent any pending 
proceeding in state tribunals, therefore, application . . . of Younger abstention was clearly erroneous.”). 
29 See id. (explaining the aggregation of standards that delineate the Younger doctrine). 
30 See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) (stating that Younger abstention applies 
in “certain civil proceedings . . . if the State’s interests in the proceeding are so important that exercise 
of the federal judicial power would disregard the comity between the States and the National 
Government”). 
31 See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367–68 (1989) 
(articulating that “[the Court] has never . . . suggested that Younger requires abstention in deference to 
a state judicial proceeding reviewing legislative or executive action” because this broad application 
“would make a mockery of the rule that only exceptional circumstances justify a federal court’s refusal 
to decide a case in deference to the States”). 
32 Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. 619, 625, 628 (1986). 
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comity.”33  In Ankenbrandt v. Richards,34 the Supreme Court held that 
Younger abstention was not merited when a mother commenced a tort suit 
on behalf of her daughters against the girls’ father.35  There, the district 
court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that in 
addition to the domestic relations exception, Younger barred the exercise 
of jurisdiction.36  The Supreme Court noted that it had “never applied the 
notions of comity so critical to Younger’s ‘Our Federalism’ when no state 
proceeding was pending nor any assertion of important state interests 
made.”37   
III.  THE YOUNGER “EXCEPTIONS” 
In what follows, this Note argues that each of the so-called exceptions 
is actually an application of the background principles of equity or 
comity.38  Commentators focus on four exceptions: (1) Bad Faith and 
Harassment, (2) Patently Unconstitutional Statutes, (3) Lack of an 
Adequate State Forum, and (4) Waiver. 39 
A.  Bad Faith and Harassment 
In Younger, the Court stated that federal courts need not abstain if 
asked to enjoin a prosecution that is brought to harass and in bad faith.40  
This exception, as applied, is not actually an exception at all but a 
straightforward application of the equity and comity principles enunciated 
in Younger.   
An injunction against prosecutions in bad faith and with intent to 
harass is consonant with the general equitable principles requiring 
                                                                                                                          
33 See Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704–05 (“[W]e have never applied the notions of comity so 
critical to Younger’s ‘Our Federalism’ when no state proceeding was pending nor any assertion of 
important state interests made.”). 
34 504 U.S. 689. 
35 Id. at 705–07 (“The courts below cited Younger . . . to support their holdings to abstain in this 
case.  In so doing, the courts clearly erred.”). 
36 Id. at 704–05.  The domestic relations exception “encompasses only cases involving the 
issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree.”  Id. at 704.  
37 Id. at 705 (emphasis added). 
38 Daniel C. Norris argues that the expansion of the Younger doctrine is such that any case 
removed to federal court can be refused under Younger abstention.  Daniel C. Norris, Comment, The 
Final Frontier of Younger Abstention: The Judiciary’s Abdication of the Federal Court Removal 
Jurisdiction Statute, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 193, 228 (2003).  Norris argues that many exceptions to the 
Younger doctrine are illusory.  Id. at 228–29 (“By essentially eliminating the right of a party to remove 
a case to federal court . . . the Court has substantially interfered with the Article III prerogatives of 
Congress.”).  My thesis is different insofar as he argues that many exceptions to the Younger doctrine 
are practically impossible to meet but I argue that the exceptions to the Younger doctrine are 
analytically indistinct from the doctrine. 
39 Brian Stagner, Avoiding Abstention: The Younger Exceptions, 29 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 137, 141, 
157, 163, 176 (1998). 
40 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 47–49 (1971). 
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irreparable harm, the parties’ good faith, and the absence of an adequate 
remedy at law.41  A prosecution commenced to harass a defendant is an 
irreparable injury because once a criminal charge has been publicly levied, 
the harm that the charge alone causes cannot be compensated for by 
damages.  Analytically, a prosecution brought to harass or intimidate 
cannot be done in good faith because the concepts are mutually exclusive.  
There is no adequate remedy at law because a jury verdict of not-guilty 
cannot cure the ill effects of having been charged.   
Notwithstanding the traditional understanding of irreparable harm, 
while it is true that many causes of action provide damages for the 
violation of certain rights,42 at times the harm caused by a bad faith 
prosecution cannot be overcome with money damages.  For example, it is 
hard to see how damages could compensate for a bad faith prosecution that 
commences on the eve of an election against a political candidate, ruining 
that candidate’s potentially singular opportunity for election.  Thus, the bad 
faith exception is just an application of the basic maxim in equity that 
courts of equity should not act unless there is not an adequate remedy at 
law and risk of irreparable injury.43  Here, as with most of the other so 
called exceptions, the principles which supported Younger, viz., comity 
and equity, have been wrongly reified and misunderstood as a result of 
twisting and solidifying them into exceptions. 
B.  Patently Unconstitutional Statutes 
The next so-called exception to Younger abstention is the presence of a 
patently unconstitutional law.  As Professor Chemerinsky has noted, “[t]his 
is a curious exception to the Younger doctrine because federal court action 
seems especially unnecessary when a state statute is so completely 
unconstitutional.”44  This too is not really an analytically independent 
exception to the Younger doctrine because there would be no disruption to 
comity or Our Federalism for a federal court to decide a case when a state 
court would undoubtedly make exactly the same decision, as the Court 
                                                                                                                          
41 See PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW’S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
AMERICA 7 (1990) (“[The judge sitting in equity] demands that parties litigating in the court act . . . 
with good faith—revealing the truth, making efforts to find some middle ground, and obeying the 
dictates of conscience.”). 
42 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (“Every person who, under color of any statute . . . 
subjects . . . any [person] . . . to the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . .”). 
43 See, e.g., Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–44 (“One is the basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that 
courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when 
the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied 
equitable relief.”). 
44 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 861 (5th ed. 2007). 
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reasoned.45  This reading is congruous with the Court’s comity-based 
concerns that federal courts ought not to make decisions founded upon 
uncertainties in state law, as reflected in the other abstention doctrines.46  
Issuing an injunction against a patently unconstitutional statute when a 
state court would do the same also meshes with the Court’s desire to 
“avoid a duplication of legal proceedings . . . where a single suit” will do.47 
Furthermore, given that comity is a proper respect for the relationship 
between state and federal governments,48 the idea of a federal court issuing 
an injunction against a patently unconstitutional law does nothing to upset 
Our Federalism but is rather “loyal to the ideals and dreams” of it.49  This 
is especially true because Our Federalism “does not mean blind deference 
to ‘States’ Rights,’” because federal courts are charged with upholding 
federal laws in a special way.50 
C.  Inadequate State Forum 
The third exception to Younger abstention is the lack of an adequate 
state forum.  A forum is not adequate if it is biased or a party is barred on 
procedural or other grounds from raising its federal claims, even if the 
highest state court has upheld the constitutionality of the law or practice at 
                                                                                                                          
45 See id. (“[T]he Court’s reasoning was that if a statute is so thoroughly unconstitutional, then the 
result is obvious and there is little interference with state courts’ decision-making because the outcome 
is preordained.”). 
46 See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (suggesting that abstention 
is justified by a desire to avoid unnecessary decisions).  This justification is similar to Buford 
abstention.  See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989) 
(“Where timely and adequate state-court review is available, a federal court sitting in equity must 
decline to interfere with the proceedings or orders of state administrative agencies: (1) when there are 
‘difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose 
importance transcends the result in the case then at bar’; or (2) where the ‘exercise of federal review of 
the question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent 
policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.’” (quoting Colo. River Water 
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976))). 
47 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. 
48 See id. (defining comity as “a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that 
the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief 
that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform 
their separate functions in their separate ways”). 
49 See id. (“The concept does not mean blind deference to ‘States’ Rights’ any more than it means 
centralization of control over every important issue in our National Government and its courts.  The 
Framers rejected both these courses.  What the concept does represent is a system in which there is 
sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and national governments . . . .”); see also 
Ankenbrandt ex rel. L.R. v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992) (“Abstention rarely should be invoked, 
because the federal courts have a ‘virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given 
them.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 817)). 
50 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. 
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issue.51  The Supreme Court held that Younger abstention was required in a 
suit brought by a state court judge despite allegations that any state forum 
would not provide a fair hearing.52  The Court emphasized the “deference” 
federal courts owe to the state criminal process.53  In so doing, it 
recognized that the “equitable restraint” at the foundation of Younger 
abstention relies “on the premise that ordinarily a pending state prosecution 
provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of 
federal constitutional rights.”54   
This deference, reflecting the notion that equity follows law55 and that 
no equitable remedy ought to be given unless there is no remedy at law, 
reveals that the inadequate state forum, like the other exceptions, is itself 
not an exception supported by analytically independent grounds, but is an 
application of the equitable principles by which the Court decided 
Younger.56  Equity has traditionally given deference to law, supplanting 
law only as necessary to achieve a fair resolution of the controversy before 
it.57  In describing an extraordinary circumstance not meriting the equitable 
restraint that Younger requires, the Court confirmed this reading when it 
stated that “such circumstances must be ‘extraordinary’ in the sense of 
creating an extraordinarily pressing need for immediate federal equitable 
relief, not merely in the sense of presenting a highly unusual factual 
situation.”58  If a state tribunal is inadequate given that it does not allow an 
aggrieved party to raise its dispute because of a procedural hurdle, then 
that party has no remedy at law and an equitable remedy is appropriate if 
an injustice is to be avoided.59  It follows that the lack of an adequate state 
                                                                                                                          
51 See id. at 45 (requiring abstention unless the state forum would not provide adequate 
protection); see also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575–78 (1973) (holding that the bias of the 
state tribunal was sufficient to overcome Younger abstention); Hansel v. Town Court, 56 F.3d 391, 394 
(2d Cir. 1995) (requiring that a party not be barred on procedural or technical grounds in order to apply 
Younger abstention).   
52 Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124–29 (1975).  
53 Id. at 124. 
54 Id. 
55 This is known as aequitas sequitor legem.  SPENCER W. SYMONS, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE § 425 (5th ed. 1941). 
56 This is not to say that some members of the Court believed that Younger abstention is entirely 
reducible to equity procedure.  See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 718 (1996) 
(“Though we have thus located the power to abstain in the historic discretion exercised by federal 
courts sitting in equity, we have not treated abstention as a technical rule of equity procedure.” (quoting 
La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
57 See SYMONS, supra note 55, § 425 (describing a traditional role of courts in equity). 
58 Kugler, 421 U.S. at 124–25 (emphasis added). 
59 The law has historically placed vexatious procedural hurdles before litigants.  See, e.g., 
ELIZABETH MAKOWSKI, ENGLISH NUNS AND THE LAW IN THE MIDDLE AGES 81–85 (2012) (describing 
how some of the more complicated medieval writs, viz., formedon in the descender and per quae 
servitia, made obtaining a remedy at law difficult for cloistered nuns and their opponents in medieval 
English courts). 
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forum is not an exception to the application of the Younger doctrine; it is 
the application of equitable principles.   
Although the Court at times has believed that it was simply applying 
equitable principles in reaching its decision in Younger,60 the principle that 
equity follows the law, aequitas sequitor legem, is not necessarily the best 
justification if taken apart from comity for considering the adequate state 
forum exception to be a straightforward application of equitable principles.  
For example, although the maxim “was frequently quoted by the earlier 
chancellors before the extent of the equitable jurisdiction had been fully 
determined” it never had “supreme and controlling efficacy.”61  In fact, “to 
raise it to the position of a general principle [of equity] would be a palpable 
error” because at times equity directly opposes the law and refuses to 
follow it.62   
D.  Waiver 
The final exception discussed by commentators is waiver by a State.63  
This exception rests on the idea that Younger abstention permits the State 
to resolve the federal dispute already under consideration in the state 
system.64  
The idea of waiver as an exception is an excellent example of why, in 
deciding Younger cases, courts should look to principles of equity and 
comity, not simply the application of categorical exceptions.  An animating 
feature of the federal abstention doctrines is the preservation of good 
relations between federal and state institutions.65  If respecting comity is a 
central purpose for the decision in Younger, then it is not at all clear that 
allowing a State to waive its Younger rights fits coherently with the 
previous doctrine.   
Imagine the following scenario.  A state judicial administrative agency 
is sued in state court on a state claim calling into question the agency’s 
                                                                                                                          
60 See Kugler, 421 U.S. at 125 (“But whatever else is required, such circumstances must be 
‘extraordinary’ in the sense of creating an extraordinarily pressing need for immediate federal equitable 
relief . . . .”). 
61 SYMONS, supra note 55, § 425. 
62 Id. § 427. 
63 Stagner, supra note 39, at 176. 
64 Id.  
65 See Ohio Bureau of Emp’t Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 480 (1977) (“It may not be argued, 
however, that a federal court is compelled to abstain in every such situation.  If the State voluntarily 
chooses to submit to a federal forum, principles of comity do not demand that the federal court force 
the case back into the State’s own system.  In the present case, Ohio either believes that the District 
Court was correct in its analysis of abstention or, faced with the prospect of lengthy administrative 
appeals followed by equally protracted state judicial proceedings, now has concluded to submit the 
constitutional issue to this Court for immediate resolution.  In either event, under these circumstances 
Younger principles of equity and comity do not require this Court to refuse Ohio the immediate 
adjudication it seeks.”) 
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impartiality.  The executive, fearing the disposition of the state case, goes 
to federal court to seek an injunction preventing the litigation.  If the 
executive is successful, not in litigating whether the federal court should 
abstain, but in waiving abstention arguments, what might that say about the 
mutual respect between the federal and state judiciaries?  Despite the 
Court’s dismissive language and method in some case law,66 it could 
suggest that the federal court does not think that the state system can 
adequately exercise its “separate functions in [its] separate way.”67   
Imagine a second scenario.  A state executive agency is sued in state 
court on a federal claim.  The executive, fearing the disposition of the state 
case, goes to federal court to seek an injunction preventing the litigation.68  
There, waiver of abstention arguments is less likely to violate comity 
because the underlying suit is a federal claim against the executive who 
herself is seeking an injunction.  Still, executive institutions are not the 
only state institutions that deserve due deference in state matters.  After all, 
the state court in which the agency was sued should also be considered.  
So, in deciding whether a state body can waive abstention, a court would 
have to look beyond the bright line of whether a State is before it.  The 
court should consider whether choosing not to abstain would, as the 
Supreme Court stated, “unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the 
States,” including the state judicial function in resolving disputes properly 
brought before it.69 
Accordingly, the waiver exception to Younger abstention is consonant 
with the Court’s opinion in Younger only if the waiver does not run afoul 
of equitable restraints or risk upsetting the balance espoused in the 
concepts of comity and Our Federalism.70   
Professor Chemerinsky argues that because a state government may 
waive its Younger abstention claim and given that Younger applies to civil 
proceedings, “there is no reason why the same waiver rules will not be 
followed in private litigation.”71  This argument is misguided, at least 
analytically, because it obviates the equity and comity principles in 
Younger.  Waiver between two private parties in civil litigation is even 
                                                                                                                          
66 Id. at 480 & n.10. 
67 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
68 I recognize that the executive could remove the case to federal court, but the purpose of the 
scenario is to focus on abstention principles. 
69 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44–45. 
70 See id. at 54 (“[O]ur holding rests on the absence of the factors necessary under equitable 
principles to justify federal intervention . . . .”); see also id. at 44 (“[T]he underlying reason for 
restraining courts of equity from interfering . . . is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the 
notion of ‘comity,’ that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire 
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the 
National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their 
separate functions in their separate ways.”). 
71 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 863. 
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more problematic than waiver by the state if it leads litigants to resort 
consistently to the federal system for injunctions to halt state proceedings 
in part because “[t]he Framers rejected” the “centralization of control over 
every important issue in our National Government and its courts.”72   
It would cause “friction”73 if a civil action is filed in state court only to 
have a federal court order that the action cease, regardless of whether both 
parties agree to the federal court’s involvement.74  This is because the 
principles of comity and Our Federalism extend beyond the desires of two 
parties before the court on any given day.  Rather, comity and Our 
Federalism require that the federal court sitting in equity respect not only 
the desires of the litigant before it,75 but also the proper relationship 
between the state and federal courts. 
While one could argue that waiver of Younger arguments would 
promote judicial efficiency and should be allowed, especially given that 
Our Federalism “does not mean blind deference to ‘States’ Rights,”76 the 
argument fails because involving a federal court in an ongoing state 
proceeding is duplicative, not efficient.77  The state court before which the 
action has commenced is probably better positioned than the federal court 
to evaluate a request for an injunction that is related to a case before the 
                                                                                                                          
72 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.  As a practical matter, it would seem odd if both parties consented to 
waiver of Younger abstention because ostensibly at least one party would not want the injunction to 
issue and waiving Younger would remove a hurdle to obtaining the injunction.   
73 Justice Frankfurter used the word “friction.”  See R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 500 
(1941) (“Few public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal chancellor than the 
avoidance of needless friction with state policies . . . .”). 
74 It is probably rare that both parties would want to waive abstention because the plaintiff in the 
state litigation would ostensibly wish to remain in the state forum.  Both parties might waive abstention 
if doing so was in their mutual interests.  Still, if the goals of the parties were to cease the state 
litigation, there would have to be an additional reason why the parties could not settle without the state 
court’s approval, as might be the case in a criminal or class action context.  This could be the case if the 
claims and counterclaims of the plaintiff and defendant were such that a stay of the state court litigation 
becomes preferable to its resolution.  Suppose the following: A plaintiff has a $100 claim with a .5 
probability of success with a $25 cost to litigate in state court and $20 cost to seek a federal injunction.  
A defendant has a $200 counterclaim with a .5 probability of success but a $75 cost to litigate in state 
court and a $20 cost to seek a federal injunction.  Given that some courts will automatically disregard 
Younger if both parties elect to waive Younger arguments, the probability of success of seeking a 
federal injunction is 1.  Accounting for the probability of success and costs at the state litigation, the 
plaintiff can gain $25 from the claim and lose $100 from the counterclaim for a net loss of $75.  The 
defendant can gain $25 from the counterclaim and lose $50 for a net loss of $25.  So as long as the cost 
to litigate for a federal injunction is less than $75 for the plaintiff and $25 for the defendant, it is in the 
interest of both parties to waive any abstention argument.   
75 See HOFFER, supra note 41, at 7 (“The parties may rely on [the court’s] good conscience to act 
in the best interests of them all.”). 
76 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. 
77 See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1976) 
(noting that federal courts can refrain from hearing duplicative cases of pending state proceedings).   
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state court.78  When a claimant brings a suit in federal court potentially 
subject to Younger abstention, the federal court must then become apprised 
of the intricacies of the state remedies available, which often involves 
learning the minutiae of a state administrative body or the finer points of 
state appellate procedure.79  While not insurmountable, such hurdles are 
more easily overcome by a state court. 
IV.  THE IMPORTANCE OF A COMITY AND EQUITY BASED ANALYSIS 
An examination of the following cases shows that an analysis based on 
the Younger principles of comity and equity is preferable to the application 
of the so-called exceptions to the Younger doctrine. 
Few cases illustrate as vividly the need to decide Younger cases with 
close attention to the principles of equity and comity as O’Neill v. 
Coughlan.80  Judge William O’Neill was a judge of the Ohio Court of 
Appeals who sought election to the Supreme Court of Ohio.81  His 
campaign ran on the theme that “Money and Judges Don’t Mix” and 
included a refusal to accept any donation larger than ten dollars and a 
website that stated, “The time has come to end the public’s suspicion that 
political contributions influence court decisions. . . . This Court is Not for 
Sale!”82  As a result, a chairman of the Republican Party filed a grievance 
with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, alleging that Judge O’Neill had 
violated the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct by identifying himself as a 
judge without specifying his court, identifying himself as a member of a 
political party, and “wrongfully attacking the credibility of the Ohio 
judiciary.”83  Like the plaintiff in Younger, Judge O’Neill sued the 
Disciplinary Counsel for the Supreme Court of Ohio in federal court under 
the First Amendment to enjoin the enforcement of the Ohio Code of 
Judicial Conduct against him.84  Interestingly, given that his political 
opponents might consider an eventual appeal, the parties did not dispute 
that Judge O’Neill could adequately raise his constitutional challenges in 
                                                                                                                          
78 One can argue that asking a state court to issue an injunction against itself—in actuality asking 
a state judge to order a fellow state judge to stop reviewing a case before him or her—is so unlikely to 
happen as to be practically impossible.  This argument is weak because it forgets that state courts have 
appellate procedure.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-278l (describing appeals for prejudgment 
remedies). 
79 For example, a suit to enjoin a state administrative judge of a state anti-discrimination 
administration might require a federal court to examine administrative regulations, guidance, and 
legislative history, in addition to ordinary state procedure.   
80 511 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2008). 
81 Id. at 639. 
82 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
83 Id. at 639–40. 
84 Id. at 639. 
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the grievance process.85   
In applying Younger abstention, the Sixth Circuit held that the state 
had not waived Younger abstention simply by failing to assert abstention 
“before arguing for dismissal of the claims on the merits.”86  The court 
noted that the State could “waive Younger abstention upon the state’s clear 
and explicit statement that it did not want the Court to apply Younger.”87  
While the court’s reliance on that rule is workable, it will not uniformly 
produce correct results because it elides the careful inquiry into Our 
Federalism and comity that the Younger doctrine demands.   
In light of the argument above that waiver by both parties is not a 
sufficient condition for a court not to abstain, O’Neill v. Coughlan 
demonstrates how an application of the waiver exception—as if it was an 
analytically independent rule—could have led the Sixth Circuit to decide 
this case incorrectly.  If the state in O’Neill v. Coughlan had unequivocally 
asked the court not to consider Younger, the district court could then have 
reached a decision on the merits.88  Yet, allowing a federal court to 
interfere here, in a political quarrel within the state judiciary, would violate 
a central tenant of Our Federalism that demands a system with “sensitivity 
to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in 
which the National Government . . . always endeavors to [enforce federal 
rights] in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities 
of the States.”89  If the state grievance process is completely capable of 
addressing the plaintiff’s claim that is inextricably linked to a dispute about 
the state judicial code of conduct, then allowing the state to waive Younger 
abstention can hardly be said to be an effort by the federal court to 
vindicate federal rights “in ways that will not unduly interfere with the 
legitimate activities of the States.”90 
A better waiver analysis by the Sixth Circuit would have considered 
that even if the State had desired to waive Younger abstention, the district 
court still should have abstained because interfering with the state 
judiciary, at the risk of violating comity, was unnecessary given that there 
                                                                                                                          
85 See id. at 643 (“O’Neill contested only the first factor, arguing that there was no ongoing state 
judicial proceeding because the filing of the grievance was a predicate to, but did not start, a state 
judicial proceeding.”).  But see id. at 646 (Moore J., dissenting) (“Although O’Neill might have 
ultimately brought his constitutional arguments before the Ohio Supreme Court, the administrative 
disciplinary process afforded him no explicit opportunity to do so prior to review by the court.  As a 
result, the administrative process did not offer O’Neill an adequate state forum to raise constitutional 
issues before the election; in the meantime, the threat of disciplinary action under the Judicial Canons 
restricted O’Neill’s political speech.”). 
86 Id. at 643. 
87 Id. at 642. 
88 See id. (“[A] state may waive an argument for Younger abstention . . . .”). 
89 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1971). 
90 Id. at 44. 
 2014] YOUNGER ABSTENTATION DOCTRINE 1991 
was no showing that the federal rights would go un-vindicated.91   
An additional consideration is the difficulty of identifying the “State.”  
In O’Neill v. Coughlan, the court assumes that the disciplinary counsel for 
a state supreme court could be the “State” for purposes of waiver.92  
However, such an assumption is unreasonable given that the state is 
comprised of more than just the judicial branch.  The assumption is 
especially unreasonable where the underlying dispute involves the integrity 
of a state’s judicial officers and where a state legislature ultimately has 
authority to impeach judges.93  Thus, a proper waiver analysis requires a 
court to consider whether a party can waive as the “State” while still 
respecting Our Federalism. 
In another case, Verizon New England, Inc. v. Rhode Island 
Department of Labor and Training,94 the First Circuit considered the 
exception for a patently unconstitutional law.95  Verizon’s unionized 
employees went on strike and applied for state unemployment benefits, 
which were ultimately granted by the state board of review.96  While 
Verizon’s appeal was pending in state court, Verizon sued in federal court 
for declaratory and injunctive relief on a theory of preemption under the 
National Labor Relations Act.97   
Verizon argued that Younger abstention was inapplicable solely 
because of the existence of a facially conclusive preemption claim.98  The 
court recognized an exception to Younger “where preemption is ‘facially 
conclusive’ or ‘readily apparent.’”99  The court noted that a preemption 
claim could not be facially conclusive if it presented “a novel question of 
law” or involved a factual dispute.100  The First Circuit held that the 
plaintiff had not made a facially conclusive preemption claim because, for 
reasons unimportant here, case law indicated a lack of preemption and 
there was a factual dispute.101  Although the court noted in passing that this 
                                                                                                                          
91 But see Joshua G. Urquhart, Younger Abstention and Its Aftermath: An Empirical Perspective, 
12 NEV. L.J. 1, 3 (2011) (suggesting that the state tribunal rarely rules favorably on any federal claims 
dismissed from federal courts under the Younger doctrine). 
92 O’Neill, 511 F.3d at 639, 641. 
93 See OHIO CONST. art. II, § 23 (“The house of representatives shall have the sole power of 
impeachment . . . .”); id. § 24 (“The governor, judges, and all state officers may be impeached . . . .”). 
94 723 F.3d 113 (1st Cir. 2013). 
95 The court considered whether a “facially conclusive” claim of preemption fell under the 
exception for statutes “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions.”  Id. at 
116–17 (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 366–67 
(1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
96 Id. at 115. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 116. 
99 Id. at 117. 
100 Id. (quoting Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Medley, 572 F.3d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 2009)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
101 Id. 
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exception “evolved out of the Supreme Court’s suggestion . . . that 
Younger abstention may not be appropriate if the federal plaintiff will 
suffer irreparable injury absent equitable relief,”102 the court’s analysis 
does not consider whether an irreparable injury will result, but instead 
focuses on the existence of a “substantial” preemption claim.103 
The Eight Circuit risked making a similar error in Geier v. Missouri 
Ethics Commission.104  There, the court concluded that the patently 
unconstitutional exception to Younger abstention did not apply to a suit 
involving a state political action committee’s efforts to reduce state 
taxation in Kansas City because the political action committee challenged a 
law under authority that was readily distinguishable from the court’s prior 
rulings.105  The court did not, however, consider whether abstaining was an 
appropriate action under the principles of comity and federalism.106  
The circuit courts’ approach will not always lead to a correct 
conclusion.  Even if there is a conclusive claim of preemption and no 
factual dispute, it does not follow that Younger abstention is inappropriate 
because if there is no risk of irreparable harm, the equitable principles 
enunciated in Younger would suggest that the federal court abstain.107  
Likewise, a tension arises by accepting the propositions both that there is 
an adequate avenue for review of federal claims in the state level and that a 
facially conclusive claim of preemption is sufficient for a federal court not 
to abstain.  If a federal court posits—as it must to even consider other 
exceptions to Younger—that the pending state proceeding allows for an 
adequate avenue of review for federal claims, then it is an ipse dixit to say 
that the presence of a facially conclusive preemption is an exception to 
Younger abstention.  This is because, ostensibly, if the state proceeding is 
adequate, the federal plaintiff is able to seek an injunction and pursue the 
preemption claim in state court.  Finally, by focusing on the patently 
unconstitutional exception independent of its equity and comity 
foundations, a court risks disrupting the careful balance of Our Federalism 
by interfering unnecessarily in ongoing state proceedings. 
 
                                                                                                                          
102 Id. at 116 (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 366 
(1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
103 Id. at 119. 
104 715 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 2013). 
105 Id. at 676, 679. 
106 Id. at 679.  
107 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971) (“There may, of course, be extraordinary 
circumstances in which the necessary irreparable injury can be shown even in the absence of the usual 
prerequisites of bad faith and harassment.”). 
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V.  COUNTERARGUMENTS 
One can argue that analyzing an abstention case by equity and comity 
principles instead of by applying standard exceptions serves no purpose 
because it would not change the outcomes.  First, as discussed above, 
whether a court focuses on exceptions or the principles of equity and 
comity can affect the disposition of a case.  For example, whether waiver 
by the state is a coherent exception depends on the nature of the claim and 
the relation of the state to the opposing party and state court.  Second, even 
if outcomes would not change, it is still useful to consider equity and 
comity principles in abstention cases insofar as it works toward conceptual 
clarity by showing that the “exceptions” to Younger abstention do not have 
any foundation apart from the principles of equity and comity.  Finally, an 
examination of how contemporary cases would be analyzed under my view 
shows that failing to recognize the centrality of comity and equity in 
Younger abstention risks making poorly justified cases. 
Second, one can argue that an emphasis on the background principles 
of equity and comity is undesirable because it gives federal judges more 
discretion even as federal power has increased.108  This counterargument 
can be taken at least two ways.  The first contends that giving federal 
courts more discretion is almost always bad.  The second argues that equity 
and comity do not provide the courts with enough guidance for the use of 
their discretion to be sound.  
Neither of these arguments is persuasive, yet circuits are split over the 
standard of appellate review in Younger cases.109  Equity exists to give 
                                                                                                                          
108 See, e.g., Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of 
Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 91 (1995) (“The increasing unchecked power of 
federal judges suggests the need for new restraints on judicial authority that respect the continuing need 
for independence of Article III judges.”). 
109 The majority of circuits use a de novo standard but some use an abuse of discretion or mixed 
standard.  See Vasquez v. Rackauckas, 734 F.3d 1025, 1035 (9th Cir. 2013) (de novo); Verizon New 
England, Inc. v. R.I. Dep’t of Labor & Training, 723 F.3d 113, 116 (1st Cir. 2013) (de novo); United 
States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 526 (4th Cir. 2013) (abuse of discretion); Geier v. Mo. Ethics 
Comm’n, 715 F.3d 674, 678 (8th Cir. 2013) (abuse of discretion); Nimer v. Litchfield Twp. Bd. of Trs., 
707 F.3d 699, 700 (6th Cir. 2013) (de novo); Jackson Hewitt Tax Serv. Inc. v. Kirkland, 455 F. App’x 
16, 17 (2d Cir. 2012) (de novo); Bice v. La. Pub. Defender Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 715 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(“This court reviews a district court's abstention ruling for abuse of discretion, but it reviews de novo 
whether the elements for Younger abstention are present.”); Pennsylvania v. Vora, 443 F. App’x 683, 
684 (3d Cir. 2011) (using plenary review for whether requirements to abstain under Younger are met 
and abuse of discretion over the lower court’s decision to abstain); Rumber v. District of Columbia, 
595 F.3d 1298, 1301–02 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (unclear whether abuse of discretion or de novo); Vill. of De 
Pue, v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 537 F.3d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 2008) (de novo); Yellowbear v. Wyo. Att’y 
Gen., 525 F.3d 921, 923 (10th Cir. 2008) (de novo); Hughes v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258, 1262 
(11th Cir. 2004) (abuse of discretion).  A de novo review is preferable because uniform applications of 
comity and equity principles will be enhanced under that standard, leading to greater consistency in the 
relationship between the state and federal systems. 
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judges discretion to achieve a fair result when law will not allow it.110  The 
fact that equity has a well-established role in our system weighs against a 
view that judicial discretion is negative.  In addition, most disputes require 
a judge because they do not have a clear resolution despite the presence of 
many so-called discretionless rules.  Also, it is deceptive to assert that 
judges ought not to have discretion because even in applying so called 
bright-line rules, a judge must make a choice as to the meaning of the 
words that compose the rule.  True, there is a long tradition in this country 
of skepticism when a single person holds legal and equitable powers,111 but 
appellate review and the development of standards over time limit the risk 
that a judge will abuse her discretion without correction.112   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Although many commentators and courts discuss Younger doctrine as 
a central rule with many exceptions, it is more intelligible and faithful to 
the doctrine to realize that the exceptions as applied are not exceptions at 
all.  In deciding whether to abstain from issuing injunctions that relate to 
pending state court litigation, federal courts should not blindly apply the 
exceptions to Younger v. Harris as if the exceptions had an independent 
legal justification in themselves, but should instead consider whether 
abstention is mandated under the principles of equity and comity. 
                                                                                                                          
110 See SYMONS, supra note 55, §§ 359, 425 (stating that equity may give a remedy that the law 
lacks). 
111 See LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER (1787), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 
WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE 19, 32, 44 (Michael P. Zuckert et al. eds., 2009) (“It is a 
very dangerous thing to vest in the same judge power to decide on the law, and also general powers in 
equity; for if the law restrain him, he is only to step into his shoes of equity, and give what judgment 
his reason or opinion may dictate; we have no precedents in this country, as yet, to regulate the 
divisions in equity as in Great Britain; equity, therefore, in the supreme court for many years will be 
mere discretion.  I confess in the constitution of this supreme court, as left by the constitution, I do not 
see a spark of freedom or a shadow of our own or the British common law.”). 
112 One could attack this claim on the ground that I have not refuted the counterargument but 
merely pushed back the worry of too much discretion from the trial court to the appellate courts.  This 
assertion would be warranted if the agreement of both the Executive and Legislature were not required 
for federal judicial appointments.  This minimizes the risk that an intemperate individual, likely to 
abuse the judicial office, will sit on the bench. 
